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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1949 
_____________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DERRICK CHAPPELLE, 
a/k/a D-NICE 
 
DERRICK CHAPPELLE, 
            Appellant 
 
      
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.:  2-12-cr-00447-001) 
District Court Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
      
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 23, 2015 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 29, 2015) 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
Arguing sentencing factor manipulation, Derrick Chappelle (“Chappelle”) appeals 
from the District Court’s sentencing order.  Because no manipulation occurred here, we 
will affirm. 
I.  Introduction 
Chappelle sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant for the FBI on two 
occasions, which were less than one month apart.  The first purchase was for 24.5 grams, 
and the second purchase was for 48.8 grams.  Thereafter, the government charged 
Chappelle with two counts of distribution of crack cocaine pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).  Chappelle pled guilty, and his 
final Guideline range was set at 77-96 months.  Chappelle argued for a downward 
variance based on what is known as “sentencing factor manipulation,” urging that the 
Government engaged in a second drug transaction so as to increase his sentence, thereby 
manipulating his sentence unfairly.  The District Court rejected this argument and 
imposed a within-Guideline sentence of 96 months.  On appeal, the sole issue is whether 
the District Court should have granted the downward variance based on this factor. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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II.  Discussion 
“In reviewing the District Court’s sentence for reasonableness, we examine its 
factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo.”  United States v. Sed, 
601 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).  We have explained that the 
“broadest formulation” of sentencing factor manipulation “holds that it is ‘a violation of 
the Due Process Clause,’ . . . when the government unfairly exaggerates the defendant’s 
sentencing range by engaging in a longer-than-needed investigation and, thus, increasing 
the drug quantities for which the defendant is responsible.”  Id. at 231 (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009)).  Similarly, 
Chappelle characterizes sentencing factor manipulation as “occur[ring] in those 
circumstances where the defendant, although inclined to commit a lesser crime, is 
manipulated by the government into committing a greater crime, and therefore a greater 
punishment.”  (Blue Br. 8 (emphasis added).) 
While we “have neither adopted nor rejected” the doctrine of sentencing factor 
manipulation, Sed, 601 F.3d at 229, we agree with the District Court that the second drug 
deal here does not constitute sentencing factor manipulation, see id. at 231 (rejecting a 
sentencing factor manipulation claim where law enforcement had arranged a second drug 
deal, thereby increasing the defendant’s sentence).  The key is manipulation, and the 
government did not in any way manipulate Chappelle, as Chappelle’s own counsel 
conceded that “he was predisposed to sell drugs.  He’s a drug dealer.  There’s no doubt 
about it.”  (App. 69.)  Although the FBI did wait a significant amount of time after the 
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second drug deal before charging Chappelle, the FBI did not use that time to unfairly 
augment Chappelle’s future prison sentence by, for instance, conducting a new drug deal 
every month for the almost three years that intervened before Chappelle was charged.  
The FBI’s decision to arrange a second drug deal was legitimate.  See United States v. 
Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is legitimate for police to continue to 
deal with someone with whom they have already engaged in illicit transactions in order to 
establish that person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or to ‘probe the depth and extent 
of a criminal enterprise, to determine whether coconspirators exist, and to trace the drug 
deeper into the distribution hierarchy.’” (quoting United States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 
123 (8th Cir. 1992))).  A contrary ruling “would unnecessarily and unfairly restrict the 
discretion and judgment of investigators and prosecutors.”  United States v. Jones, 18 
F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir. 1994).  Accordingly, Chappelle has not established sentencing 
factor manipulation, even if we were to adopt the doctrine, and the District Court’s 
within-Guideline sentence was reasonable. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s sentencing order.   
